A monthly report on an internal, formally structured "网络深度处理项目" (Deep Network Processing Project) lists two active work streams with front-end-integrated deliverables (experimental evaluation reports, technical summary reports, work summary reports, test cases): (1) tunnel/protocol identification for L2TP, PPTP, SSLVPN, IPSec, OpenVPN, plus separately Shadowsocks (SS) and Tor protocol identification; and (2) "加密流量破解" (encrypted-traffic cracking), covering MITM attacks against SSH/RDP/HTTPS connections and certificate public-key cracking spanning 9 distinct RSA and ECC cracking algorithms.

An internal TSG operations/troubleshooting manual lays out TSG's full traffic pipeline (NIC -> mrzcpd/marsio capture driver -> sapp DPI engine -> firewall/proxy(KNI->TFE)/active-defense/WAN-NAT policy branches) and shows engineers using maat_redis_tool to pull the live Redis-synced blocking policy tables (TSG_SECURITY_COMPILE, TSG_OBJ_IP_ADDR, TSG_OBJ_APP_ID) and filter them by numeric policy/object ID to debug why a block rule isn't firing.

The internal 'MAAT网络流处理配置统一描述框架' engineering manual (v3.1.20, author name redacted, 2021) documents MAAT's Redis-synced rule-compilation framework and its RuleScan/Hyperscan-based pattern-matching engine (libmaatframe.so / librulescan), and records that RuleScan's fast-scan feature caused a production outage on 2019-03-19 and has been disabled ever since.

An internal design note for a 'Shadowsocks traffic parsing/restoration module' describes decrypting captured Shadowsocks payloads back to the original HTTP request/response, given a known pre-shared key (AES-256-CFB, MD5-derived key, IV embedded in the stream).

A dedicated internal "运营商前端分析团队" (Carrier Front-end Analysis Team) produces weekly, carrier-specific traffic-analysis reports explicitly titled "新疆移动流量分析报告" (Xinjiang Mobile Traffic Analysis Report) and "新疆联通流量分析报告" (Xinjiang Unicom Traffic Analysis Report), with instances dated from at least July 2022 through March 2024. One instance (Xinjiang Mobile, 2023-05-15) reports total carrier bandwidth of 4.4Tbps (1Tbps access bandwidth), 27.34PB of weekly throughput, 123 distinct identified application-layer protocols, and a section (4.1, pages 17+) explicitly tracking server IP/location for 28 named overseas apps (BBC, Discord, ESPN, Facebook, Gmail, Google, Hulu, Instagram, Netflix, Reddit, Skype, Telegram, Twitter, Uber, WhatsApp, Wikipedia, YouTube, Zoom, etc.).

The same 2024 IIE CAS thesis proposes 'PED' (Packet-context based Evasion Detection): an XGBoost flow-feature pre-filter followed by a GRU-based autoencoder trained on packet-context features (inter-packet plus protocol-layer, including HTTP-layer fields) that flags DPI-evasion traffic via reconstruction error, reporting accuracy/ROC-AUC above 0.88/0.97 and generalizing to the public CICIDS and MAWI datasets; the thesis also proposes a deployable LAN-gateway evasion-detection prototype and four DPI-middlebox hardening recommendations (mimic Suricata's strict field validation, enforce RFC-compliant parsing, add ML-based anomaly detection, run regular red-team evaluations).

A 2018 MESA Lab monthly report describes work on the "GPS"/"先导" (Pioneer) active-probing projects: adding IPv6 scanning support and simultaneous 3-domain scanning to MAAT, alongside active-probing experiments (nslookup/dig/nmap) and root-DNS-server BGP-anycast measurement -- indicating MAAT's rule engine is paired with an active network-scanning subsystem, not purely passive/inline matching.