geedge.lantern.io
detection confidence: high public

Geedge extracted ProtonVPN server IPs using the app's own debug-log output to find its server-list API endpoint, directly querying it to harvest ~5,800 server IPs, then used automated repeated connection cycling to extract ~200 additional rotating IPs after the initial list was blocked; the app was subsequently reported fully blocked on Android, iOS, and Windows.

使用软件中debug logs获取启动后获取节点的api,该url可以直接访问获取节点列表,请求后获取IP 5800余个...使用自动化方式循环提取新的serverip特征200余个...补充特征后,安卓、IOS、windows三平台完全阻断

Defense implications

censorsgeneric
techniquesip-blocking
productstsg
capabilitydpi-signature

extracted_by: claude-sonnet-5 · added 2026-08-26 · id: 2026-oss374-protonvpn-api-enum

Related findings

detection

TSG/CM ships with pre-built, first-class 'Learning Object' entries specifically for Freegate (Object ID 18) and Psiphon3 (Object ID 19), plus a generic 'Top Server IP' object (ID 20) -- default product features, not customer-commissioned custom signatures. The Psiphon3 object auto-learns and dynamically updates a live blocklist that reached roughly 70,000 IPs at one deployment before a database issue temporarily dropped it to ~50,000.

deployment

A crash/perf bug report reveals Geedge's MAAT rule engine (libmaatframe.so, using Intel Hyperscan for literal/regex matching) running with 545,441 FQDN blocking rules and 404,141 IP address blocking rules loaded in a single instance as of 2024; loading 500,000 new FQDN rules via the full Hyperscan path took ~95 minutes, addressed by an automatic fallback to a second engine ("Rulescan") above 50,000 rules.

detection

Engineers built and deployed IP-list and SNI-wildcard signatures to block Cloudflare WARP (the 1.1.1.1 app), including wildcard SNI blocking of *.cloudflare.com. A CTO-level engineer (name redacted) personally flagged the SNI-based rule as likely to cause false positives against unrelated Cloudflare-fronted traffic, given Cloudflare's role as a major CDN.

detection

Geedge extracted and analyzed Betternet VPN's underlying protocols (WireGuard, a proprietary "Hydra" protocol using spoofed-domain TLS 1.2, and IKEv2), and found the Hydra protocol could be "completely blocked" via JA3 TLS fingerprinting; IKEv2 was blocked via UDP port 500/4500 policy, and thousands of VPN server IPs were extracted as a supplementary IP blocklist.

detection

Geedge runs an ongoing, largely manual weekly signature-extraction program against commercial VPN apps (LetsVPN, Betternet, VPNLITE, and a ~80-app batch), combining server-IP lists, FQDN patterns, and payload/SNI/Host/User-Agent signatures, tested for blocking efficacy and false-positive rate before rollout. VPNLITE was fingerprinted via TCP direct-connect on ports 18000/3320/8099 plus TLS to randomized .xyz/.info subdomains on Cloudflare ranges (104.21.0.0/16, 172.67.0.0/16).

detection

relationship-gtpc-user derives a single per-subscriber correlation key as Hashkey = md5(IMEI + IMSI + phone_number + vsys_id) from mobile-core GTP-C signaling, and a separate per-tunnel key gtp_uuid = md5(uplink_teid + "|" + downlink_teid). On every update it writes not just the primary user<->TEID row (tsg_galaxy:relation_user_teid) but up to four additional secondary-index rows into tsg_galaxy:gtpc_knowledge_base, one per identifier (IMEI, IMSI, phone number, APN) with a type-digit prefix ("0"/"1"/"2"/"3") and — for phone number and APN — the value's characters reversed before use as the row key, a range-scan-friendly key design that lets any of the four identifiers be used to look up the associated tunnel/session independently.