Peer-review correspondence on the companion PhD thesis ('Tor隐藏服务溯源管控关键技术研究', same MESA Lab body of work as the AlterCell report) documents a third technique -- a descriptor-cache-overflow-based denial-of-service that drove a target hidden service's accessibility down by 90% in real Tor network testing at low, sustained cost -- and shows a reviewer explicitly flagging the thesis for undisclosed state-security sensitivity and instructing the author to replace the original '管控' (state control/management) framing with the more academic 'denial of service' term, while the thesis's own stated motivation is '维护国家网络安全和社会稳定' (safeguarding national cybersecurity and social stability).

An internal MESA Lab presentation by a MESA Lab researcher (name/email redacted) describes 'CartoDNS', a global active/passive encrypted-DNS reconnaissance system that uses DNS-watermark injection across multi-region probing nodes to map DoT/DoH/DoQ resolver topology; as of the presentation it had discovered 80,000+ DoT, 20,000+ DoH and 4,000+ DoQ IPv4 resolvers (plus 1,100+ DoT and 500+ DoH over IPv6) and cataloged 500+ service providers with concrete IP ranges (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, AdGuard, 360, Alibaba, Tencent, etc.), running continuously since December 2021.

A June 2024 internal MESA Team survey ('针对审查系统的科学研究及探测技术调研报告') catalogs the academic censorship-measurement toolkit (OONI, Augur, Satellite, Quack/Hyperquack, GFWatch, GFWeb, middlebox weaponization studies, traceroute-based middlebox localization, device fingerprinting) and separately reviews circumvention-tool countermeasures, explicitly naming Lantern alongside Psiphon, Tor Meek and Signal as tools using uTLS-style TLS ClientHello mimicry and domain-fronting.

An internal TSG operations/troubleshooting manual lays out TSG's full traffic pipeline (NIC -> mrzcpd/marsio capture driver -> sapp DPI engine -> firewall/proxy(KNI->TFE)/active-defense/WAN-NAT policy branches) and shows engineers using maat_redis_tool to pull the live Redis-synced blocking policy tables (TSG_SECURITY_COMPILE, TSG_OBJ_IP_ADDR, TSG_OBJ_APP_ID) and filter them by numeric policy/object ID to debug why a block rule isn't firing.

The internal 'MAAT网络流处理配置统一描述框架' engineering manual (v3.1.20, author name redacted, 2021) documents MAAT's Redis-synced rule-compilation framework and its RuleScan/Hyperscan-based pattern-matching engine (libmaatframe.so / librulescan), and records that RuleScan's fast-scan feature caused a production outage on 2019-03-19 and has been disabled ever since.

An internal TSG functional-requirements spec ('加密协议JG') defines device support for identifying and blocking ECH, ESNI and QUIC traffic via per-connection SNI/region-matching tables (e.g. DF_QUIC_REGION), plus a companion 'FD报文全流程感知' feature that both passively monitors and actively injects synthetic verification traffic end-to-end through the network path to compute a live per-rule 'CT率' (breakthrough/penetration rate) — the system self-measures how often its own QUIC/ESNI/ECH blocks fail to take effect, and separately throttles logging/blocking detail for rule IDs receiving unusually high hit counts (DF_ATTACK_PROTECTION, 'targeted attack detection').

An internal MESA Lab report (2021-06-25) documents a live test in which a second sapp instance ('sapp B') receives fully decrypted plaintext HTTP traffic via a Unix domain socket from a third-party TLS decryption platform, while sapp A separately captures raw ciphertext via the mrzcpd driver. 24 hours of the decrypted logs (319,569 HTTP records) show the top intercepted destinations are Facebook, Twitter, Google/YouTube and Instagram, with client IPs traced to residential China Telecom/Unicom/Mobile subscribers in Guangdong, Zhejiang and other provinces.